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The story of the Consultative Business Movement (CBM), a group of progressive company leaders 
that took action to help facilitate the transition to a democratic South Africa, has taken its place in 
the cannon business and peace. Any number of studies describe how the CBM normalized 
engagement with opponents of the apartheid regime, in particular black leaders; facilitated dialogue 
between a wide range of stakeholders to help identify common ground; supported efforts to mitigate 
rising violence; and ultimately served as Secretariat to the convention that delivered the country’s 
new constitution.  
 
The story as typically told is in large measure true; however, it is incomplete. The CBM – which was 
active only six years at the tail end of minority rule – emerged from business interests that were for 
more than a century deeply entwined in the politics, policies and practices of the violent repression of 
the majority, and somewhat more than a decade of tentative business efforts to engage socially to 
promote stability. During the period in which the CBM was active, only a relatively small number of 
businesses mobilized in any decisive way for positive change, while many more were actively 
engaged in the maintenance of the apartheid state. And in the two decades since the CBM, 
increasing numbers of commentators bemoan a business community that is perceived as being at 
best indifferent to issues of social justice and at worst deeply complicit in the maintenance of a 
political economy that reinforces the divisions that arguably underlie a number of the crises the 




Within this fuller contextualization of the CBM’s efforts, a number of questions arise that have been 
less well addressed in the literature. First, how did the CBM succeed in its efforts, given that it faced 
not only scepticism from mass movement leaders, but hostility from government and, often enough, 
opposition from the broader business community? Second, what were the limitations of what even 
progressive business leaders could and would work for, given their economic interests? Third, what 
are the lessons learned from the historical analysis that may have resonance today? 
 
To address these issues and questions, this paper draws from the historical record and secondary 
research; interviews; the insights of an expert roundtable convened to consider and debate these 
issues; and three input papers prepared to advance that inquiry that are also available as ACDS 
Working Papers: Ramphela (2017/2), Cawe (2017/3), and Hutchings (2017/4).  
 
Business in the shaping of the political economy of South Africa 
 
It is increasingly well accepted that business never stands apart from politics, but is rather part and 
parcel of the political economy – the interplay of politics, society and economics that shapes the 
social order and the creation and distribution of wealth within it. In South Africa, one can further 
assert that business interests were a dominant factor in the shaping of the country and its political 
system. This was true throughout the country’s colonial history: a driving factor in the treks that led 
to the formation of the Boer republics, for example, was the introduction of more progressive labour 
laws in the Cape Colony in 1828 and the abolition of slavery in the British Empire in 1834 that 
negatively affected the financial interests of the Cape Colony farmers. It was particularly true after 
commercial exploitation began of diamond deposits around what is now Kimberley in the 1860s and 
gold around what is now Johannesburg in the 1870s. 
 
Intertwined commercial interests and state authority shaped the emergent South Africa. The 1882 
Diamond Trade Act, for example, foreshadowed the police powers of later regimes: a person found 
with diamonds was presumed guilty of illegal trading until proven innocent; policemen could search 
without warrants; and mail and packages could be opened upon mere suspicion. Later, breach of 
employment contract was made a criminal offense – for the employee but not for the employer. 
John Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa Company – itself a public-private partnership with joint 
imperial and commercial designs across the Limpopo – provided the troops for the Jameson raid in 
1897, intended to provoke a British uprising in the Boer Transvaal. Although a tactical failure, the 
raid was all the same an instigating factor in the Second Boer War, which brought all of current 
South Africa – most notably its gold, which Rhode’s Gold Fields Corporation (among other English-
backed companies) would go on to exploit – under British rule. 
 
Moral outrage against commercial excesses – even among Europeans – was evident from the 
beginning. Already in the 1890s voices at home decried the ‘slavish system’ of compounds – in which 
diamond (and later gold) workers were forced to live apart from their families to maintain control 
3 
 
and minimize theft – because of its impact not only on workers but on surrounding communities and 
the economy as a whole. In Europe, the British periodical Truth in 1893 called Rhodes ‘the head of a 
gang of shady financiers’ who operated ‘on the principle that “godless heathen” ought to be mowed 
down with Maxim guns if they happen to inhabit a country where there may be gold’. 
Yet commercial interests prevailed in the then-new South Africa. The president of the Chamber of 
Mines stated unequivocally in 1912, 'We must have labour. The mining industry without labour is as 
... it would be to imagine that you could get milk without cows.' The Chamber supported the Natives 
Land Act of 1913, which introduced territorial segregation to the country shortly after its founding in 
1910. Reserves for the black population were created that represented only about 10% of the 
country’s land area. The president of the Chamber was of the opinion that the Act would ensure that 
‘the surplus of young men, instead of squatting on the land in idleness ... must earn their living by 
working for a wage’. Building on a history of hut taxes, poll taxes and unemployment taxes (under 
which Africans who could not show that they held formal employment for at least some months a 
year were subject to an additional tax), these measures guaranteed the mines cheap labour. The 
Chamber also supported the state’s brutal suppression of successive waves of the black labour 
movement in the 1910s, the 1940s and the 1960s. These land and labour ‘reforms’ were similarly 
backed by the country’s politically and economically important agricultural sector, for reasons of 
land acquisition, suppression of black competition, and wage control. While their relative primacy 
remains debated, it is clear that colonialism, apartheid, control of labour, and business interests 
were fundamentally enmeshed. 
 
Business attempts at promoting stability  
 
In the 1970s, the evident ability of labour to mount effective strikes, the need for more highly skilled 
workers, and the closing of labour recruitment from Malawi, Angola and Mozambique changed the 
mining landscape. One mining executive noted, ‘the game changed when developments in 
technology meant it took more than three weeks to train a new mineworker. We could no longer 
fire a thousand men today and replace them tomorrow. We had to negotiate with black workers.’ By 
1972 W.D. Wilson, Deputy Chairman of the mining conglomerate Anglo American Corporation, 
called for a ‘major overhaul’ of labour law and labour relations, stating that reforms would 
determine ‘whether we will retain industrial peace and whether we will have the human resources 
to continue the development and expansion of our enterprises’. Harry Oppenheimer, Chairman of 
Anglo American, declared that ‘racial discrimination and free enterprise are basically incompatible’.  
 
Business engagement based on these changed notions was meaningful. After the Soweto uprising of 
1976, Oppenheimer and other leading industrialists founded the Urban Foundation to help improve 
the living conditions of the black urban population. Its first executive director stated that ‘No free 
enterprise system can survive in circumstances of persistent social disruption and disorder.’ Support 
for the Wiehahn Commission on labour reform and subsequent changes to the Industrial 
Conciliation Act led to the legalisation of black unions in 1979. Industry leaders, recognising that 
state agents could not be trusted by black employees, negotiated with labour leaders the creation of 
4 
 
the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA) in 1984 as a regime of private justice 
between workers and companies.  
 
But these were fundamentally palliative measures, arguably akin to the abolition in the 1980s under 
State President P.W. Botha of the pass laws, the granting of rights to blacks to live in urban areas and 
the decriminalisation of interracial marriage, or his government’s increase in spending for black 
schools from one-sixteenth of what was spent per white child up to one-seventh. There was at some 
level a recognition that a fundamentally unworkable system was driving the protests of an 
increasingly well-organized mass movement. Yet business measures were by and large an attempt to 
take the sharp edges off the system, not change it fundamentally. 
Private sector ‘institutions and initiatives appeared to want to follow an ongoing incremental route 
and to rely primarily upon Government-led initiatives’. Businesses were most vocal when issues 
affected their direct needs, for example, for greater numbers of skilled laborers or the ability to 
negotiate formally with the de facto black unions. Almost no businesses spoke out against 
segregated residential areas or education, for black political rights, or against the increasingly brutal 
measures of the police state, which used, for example, arrest, banning and assassination to stem the 
growing power of the unions, even bombing the headquarters of the Congress of South Africa Trade 
Unions (COSATU) in 1987. 
Business engagement for a democratic South Africa 
 
Amidst a growing economic crisis, escalating violence, biting international sanctions, and an 
increasing sense of isolation, a number of business leaders took steps to reach out to democratic 
forces inside the country and the African National Congress (ANC) in exile. In January 1987 Chris Ball, 
the CEO of then Barclays Bank, identified in early 1987 a handful of senior leaders ‘who shared the 
opinion that traditional methods of interaction with mainly black unions and political leaders being 
employed within business and organised industry and commerce were inadequate’. He proposed 
direct communication between ‘legitimate black leaders who enjoyed mass-based support and 
white mainstream business leaders.’ Ball had been part of a 1985 initiative, in which he and senior 
leaders of Standard Bank, Rothschilds, Shell, Courtaulds, BP, Gold Fields, and Premier Group met in 
London with Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, at the invitation of the journalist Anthony 
Sampson. 
 
Over a period of months, the interventions of well-networked allies, including the television 
journalists Roger and Miranda Harris, allowed for several meetings between business and black 
leaders of the UDF. ‘During these meetings the concept of establishing a group of business leaders 
who would interact intensively with legitimate black leaders was discussed. They, in turn, were 
willing to endorse and support the initiative that had already been taken by other black leaders.’ 
Meetings were also held with ANC leaders in exile, who also lent their support to the idea. In April 
1988, business representatives met with senior members of the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) and the UDF. ‘At this meeting it was agreed that a formal workshop should be 
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conducted between senior business leaders and representatives of the mass-based movements.’ In 
August 1988, approximately forty white business leaders and senior academics met with a similar 
number of leaders representing several mass-based socio-political movements and unions, 
establishing what was only then named the Consultative Business Movement (CBM).  
 
True to its name, the CBM began a process of broad-based bilateral consultations: with leaders of 
the UDF and the (still banned) ANC; with the National Party and senior government civil servants and 
diplomats; with other political parties including the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the Democratic 
Party, and later, the more militant Pan African Congress (PAC) and Azanian People's Organisation 
(AZAPO), as well as the right wing Arikaner Volkswag and Conservative Party; civil society leaders 
from the press and churches; and organized business and organized labour, both black and non-
black. These discussions continued throughout 1988 and 1989, establishing both the need and the 
possibility for common ground. 
 
Bilateral trust-building laid the foundation for multi-lateral successes. In 1990 the CBM organised a 
meeting of 40 ANC representatives, including Nelson Mandela, with 350 senior business leaders to 
reduce mutual distrust and start work towards a new national economic framework. ‘At last’, it was 
said, ‘we are discussing our country’s future’. When political violence put the entire peaceful 
transition to democracy in doubt, the CBM along with the South African Council of Churches was 
able to convene government and opposition parties in the offices of Barlow Rand Ltd, South Africa’s 
second largest industrial concern. The CBM co-convened process was the beginning of negotiations 
leading up to the National Peace Accord in 1991, which exposed tens of thousands of people to 
conflict resolution methodologies and created national, regional and local structures that ‘helped 
contain violence, altered the attitude of the security forces and introduced an element of public 
accountability and pressure for peace’. 
 
This in turn set the stage for constitutional negotiations. The CBM was asked by the participating 
political parties and government authorities to provide process support and secretariat services for 
the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) I & II, two rounds of multi-party talks. The 
CBM later acted as the administration of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process, which put into motion 
South Africa’s ultimate transition to democracy. And where Lord Carrington and Henry Kissinger had 
failed to secure the agreement of the Inkatha Freedom Party to participate in the first elections, 
risking renewed violence, the CBM-supported process succeeded. South Africans voted in their first 
democratic election on 27 April 1994 under the interim constitution. The CBM ceased to exist when 
it merged with the Urban Foundation in 1995 to form the National Business Initiative, not quite two 
years before the coming into force of the final constitution on 4 February 1997. 
 




The snapshot presented above does not give a full picture of the CBM’s activities, which became 
increasing structured over time. The CBM developed programmes, for example, to find employment 
for released detainees, and to facilitate the internal transformation of companies. But the weight of 
its positive influence came from its leadership’s willingness ‘to listen first, then act in partnership; at 
a time when consultation was both unknown and almost impossible because of the polarisation in 
society. This was seen as CBM’s greatest strength’. There was a relentless focus on outreach: several 
hundred meetings were conducted throughout South Africa between April and August 1988, for 
example, to build commitment by business leaders to create relationships with ‘recognised black 
leaders of established mass-based socio-political movements’; and the CBM only moved forward 
when it had secured the support of black leaders. ‘This was the first, and probably still only time in 
South Africa’s history’, it was noted, ‘that a business-led institution was created through direct 
consultation with largely black leadership and mass-based institutions’. 
 
The mission statement adopted by the CBM was ‘to assist South African business to contribute in 
partnership with all other interest groups to democracy, peace, growth and development in South 
Africa’. That is to say, it recognized that business, too, needed to change. Most of the work carried 
out under the umbrella of CBM – from the initial intermediation between business and black leaders 
by journalists and others who had the trust of mass movement leaders; to the consultations carried 
out by ‘young and dynamic’ staff members; to the organisation and operation of the peace 
committees – was in fact carried out by individuals who were not deeply imbedded in corporate 
structures. The organisation of CBM allowed it to be closely aligned with progressive business 
leaders, but independent enough to also influence them; business leaders created structures where 
they were one constituency among many at the table.  
 
The way CBM worked also gave meaning to the word ‘Movement’ in its name. It created structures – 
particularly at the regional level, and later with the National Peace Accord at the local level – that 
could opportunistically absorb energy and commitment, as well as channel money and social capital 
as more people inside and outside the business community became comfortable with, and 
committed to, a peaceful transition to majority rule. This to some extent encompassed even the 
apartheid government, particularly after F.W. de Klerk took over the reins of the state from P.W. 
Botha in 1989; the government craved and valued information about the mass democratic 
movement and its leaders that its self-isolating policies denied it. CBM also never claimed to 
represent business, meaning that it was to some extent insulated from the ‘least common 
denominator’ politics of member organisations. Indeed, its support rarely came from corporate 
boards or management teams – let alone organised business – as a whole, but rather from targeted 
individuals within companies and other institutions. It was self-consciously a vanguard coalition of 
willing individuals with business roots. 
 
Where the ‘business’ bona fides of CBM were perhaps most clear were in its use of its leaders’ 
power and privilege to act in defiance of the apartheid regime. It was no secret that the law was not 
applied equally in South Africa; there were many instances, for example, where a black women 
would be convicted and punished for violation of the miscegenation laws, while her white male 
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partner would go free. CEOs of some of South Africa’s most important concerns could take 
advantage of this structural injustice to take calculated risks. In one case meetings were held with 
opposition leaders in detention during their trial for treason, with their counsel bringing in the 
business representative as part of the legal team; in another a co-facilitator of the meeting 
establishing CBM was under restriction orders making it illegal for him – or others with him – to 
participate in a meeting of more than five people. CBM simply ignored legal restrictions on its ability 
to meet with banned organizations such as the ANC and PAC, and worked around restrictions on 
organised labour and other ‘suspect’ organisations and individuals. 
 
More importantly, CBM used its power and networks of influence on behalf of others. The morality 
of apartheid defenders may have been misplaced, but their observations were true: CBM lent voice 
and credibility to leaders of the opposition, replacing propaganda about communist revolutionaries 
manipulated from abroad with experience of pragmatic, thoughtful and deeply committed leaders. 
CBM earned their trust by doing what no South African business entity had done before: reject racial 
authoritarian government and commit to the rapid implementation of majoritarian rule. It 
committed  unambiguously in policy and action to the principles and outcomes of greatest 
importance to the disempowered and disenfranchised. In doing so, it used its process focus – 
expanding the circle of dialogue, establishing a common fact base, working towards consensus on 
outcomes, agreeing on roles, responsibilities, and obligations for action, and maintain a platform for 
mutual accountability – to meaningful shift power and facilitate fundamental social change. 
 
Self interest as the limiter of business engagement? 
 
The CBM and other business for peace stories have given rise to a generalised argument about a 
‘business case’ for peacebuilding. Previous studies of CBM have warned, however, that ‘it is 
important not to exaggerate the role CBM played, nor to make claims for business in general’. The 
limitation of the business role is evident in the problematic timing, breadth, and scope of business 
engagement in South Africa, both by CBM and by business more generally. 
 
Business came to the movement for a democratic South Africa very late. The Sharpsville Massacre – 
an event so iconic that the new South African constitution was signed into law there in 1996, and the 
date commemorated both as a national holiday and as the International Day for the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination – was in 1960. The UN Security Council’s adoption in the same year of 
Resolution 134, calling for an end to apartheid and racial discrimination, marked growing 
international isolation as the government implemented the first state of emergency. In 1970, the 
then-Anglican Bishop of Lesotho, the Rev. Desmond Tutu, assumed a leadership role in the non-
violent struggle against apartheid as head of the South African Council of Churches; increasingly 
well-organised labour organized the surprisingly effective Durban Strikes of 1973; while in 1975 the 
ANC Revolutionary Council publicized its intent to launch ‘total war’, followed by increasingly 
sophisticated armed attacks. 1976 saw the Soweto Youth Uprising – a youth-inspired protest 
resulting from the consciousness raising efforts of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), itself a 
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non-aligned political movement started by young university students that spread to high schools, 
churches and civil society organizations – spread across the country and into the next year. 1980 saw 
both massive school and university strikes, and a declaration by the Nederduitse Gereformerde Kerk 
(NGK) together with its sister church for blacks (the NGK in Afrika), Coloureds (the NG Sendingkerk) 
and Indians (the Reformed Church in Africa) that it had no objection to the repeal of the Immorality 
Act or the Mixed Marriages Act, a death knell for religious support of apartheid. The UDF was 
formed in 1983; the new state of emergency was declared in 1985; and COSATU was formed the 
same year. Even these very few milestones in the long anti-apartheid struggle illustrate that the 
writing was increasingly both on the wall and being read by growing numbers of South Africans of all 
races from the 1960s through the 1980s. 
 
Yet business was hardly to be found. Only in 1986 did the South African Federated Chamber of 
Industries adopt its South African Business Charter of Social, Economic and Political Rights; but its 
programme was never implemented and the charter was divisive enough amongst the membership 
to lead to the demise of the Chamber. In 1987, black leaders asked that a group of business leaders 
join them in a statement to the press calling for the lifting of the state of emergency and certain 
restriction orders, as it was increasingly impossible for moderate leaders to exercise any influence 
over escalating violence in the townships. But no more than six business leaders would sign onto the 
statement, and the idea was shelved. Similarly, anti-apartheid activists that same year arranged for 
18 leaders from the black community to meet with business leaders. Eighteen business leaders 
attended a preparatory briefing, but only 6 remained to meet with the black leaders after twice as 
many excused themselves. As late as 1989 CBM could count no more than 40  business members, 
only passing the 100 mark after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990 amidst a growing understanding 
that political changes were inevitable. The first regional meeting CBM organized between business 
leaders and mass movement leaders in the Western Cape begins to look like the caboose rather than 
the locomotive of change; it took so long to organize that it was interrupted by the announcement 
of Nelson Mandela’s release. 
 
Far more common than the actions exemplified by the CBM was what the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission described as ‘the role business played or failed to play in the apartheid years’, ranging 
from active collaboration in security structures to more passively benefiting from apartheid’s labour 
repression, pass laws, and forced removals. Other business-led initiatives, such as the South Africa 
Foundation, gained the reputation of existing mainly to stave off international sanctions rather than 
to support any kind of fundamental reform. And even after the Durban strikes made clear the need 
to change the basis of labour relations, companies created ‘employer-controlled liaison committees 
to circumvent works committees elected by the black workers themselves’, with true labour-
management reform coming first (if still only reluctantly) to foreign companies facing the greatest 
international scrutiny. It was even impossible at the founding meeting of CBM to agree to include 
‘democracy’ in the new organisation’s name. An alternative recounting of the CBM story might be 
that, in the long struggle for a democratic and peaceful South Africa in which countless South 
Africans courageously took part, only a very few business leaders, and almost no presence of 




Indeed, it is arguably only through a narrow, white, business-centric lens on history that a crisis can 
be particularly situated in the 1980s, finally motivating even a minority of the business community to 
more concerted action. Apartheid – an explicit policy of institutional racism – has roots at least as 
deep as 1858, when the constitution of the South African Republic (commonly known as Transvaal 
Republic) was adopted, stating that ‘the people will admit of no equality of persons of colour with 
the White inhabitants, either in state or in church’. The system of forced migrant labour began the 
systematic disruption of the black family in the 1860s; blacks in the territory of now-South Africa 
were dispossessed of nearly all of their land in 1913. Blacks were systematically denied education, 
health care, decent housing, economic opportunities, and political rights throughout the 20th 
century, including the right to South African citizenship in 1980. Meanwhile, the State engaged in a 
campaign of terror against its enemies, with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission finding state 
president P.W. Botha responsible for gross violations of human rights; to have directly authorised 
unlawful activity which included killing; and to have personally ordered the bombing of the offices of 
the South African Council of Churches. It is said that a crisis is something bad that happens to 
oneself; and it appears that business organised and mobilized in favour a democratic South Africa 
only as social unrest and revolutionary threats could no longer be contained, and international 
isolation limited both capital and markets, posing an existential threat to business interests. 
 
An appetizer without the main course? 
 
The limited scope of business engagement is perhaps also underlined by the rapidity with which 
CBM withdrew from public discourse. CBM and the Urban Foundation merged in 1995 to form the 
National Business Initiative (NBI), with a declared mission to continue private-sector engagement in 
South Africa’s peaceful development. Yet the CBM consultative structures, including the peace 
committees, were dismantled or allowed to wither. NBI took on the look and feel of a more typical 
business member organisation, shifting its emphasis from political mobilization on behalf of values 
and principles to developing, funding and delivering social programs, and moving from a 
commitment to broad-based consultation and consensus building to a more limited focus on 
government relations. 
 
The more cynical reading of this rapid retreat was that the business interests in the South African 
transition had been successfully met. Theuns Eloff as former head of the CBM is – although he may 
not have intended to be – particularly damning. ‘Business’ hopes for the new South Africa had been 
fulfilled’, he stated, ‘to a larger extent’. Revolution had been averted; the liberal precepts of 
‘economic growth and wealth creation’ has been imbedded in national policy; property rights were 
protected; and international capital and markets were again available. The CBM retired from public 
life as the government was preparing the groundwork for a macroeconomic policy framework called 
the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, with a focus on reducing fiscal deficits, 
lowering inflation, maintaining exchange rate stability, decreasing barriers to trade and liberalizing 
capital flows. These policies brought about greater macroeconomic stability, laying the foundation 
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for the business boom that followed. But they did not begin to meet their goals of poverty reduction 
or employment creation, the issues of greatest concern to the vast majority of South Africans but 
which the business community was free to ignore or downplay. 
 
A more sympathetic view of the transition from CBM to the NBI recognizes that there was need to 
respect and support the new, democratically elected government – to give it space to ‘rule and 
govern’. Additionally, economic orthodoxy of the day, characterized by the Washington consensus of 
the 1980s and 90s, gave credence to the notion of an ‘apolitical economy’, and to the belief that 
wealth creation (driven by a robust private sector) and wealth distribution (overseen by 
government) could somehow be treated as separate and largely unrelated functions. So when the 
issues important to the broader society – basic education, HIV/AIDS, housing, land reform, job 
creation, and so on – remained largely unaddressed, business could declare its wish for better 
government, and provide palliative support, rather than take direct responsibility for positive 
change.  
 
The truth is perhaps a combination of both assessments, recognizing as well that the business 
community and its motives are far from homogeneous. Either way, there appears to be a deep and 
wide divide in South Africa society over the meaning of peace. For many South Africans, the 
democratic transition only whetted the collective appetite for the promises captured in the 
preamble to South Africa’s new constitution, which establishes a new social order to: 
 
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental human rights;  
 
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the 
will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law;  
 
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and  
 
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state 
in the family of nations. 
 
While for the weight of the business community the political settlement leading to democratic 
elections in 1994 might be the hoped-for peace, for most South Africans it was the appetizer for a 
main course still yet to come. 
 




South Africa again finds itself in a period that the business community is increasingly willing to 
recognize as a crisis, and the mainstream business agenda is again increasingly overtly political: state 
capture, official corruption, and breakdowns in security and the rule of law, for example. It has 
shown the ability to mobilize decisively, for example, to oppose and reverse the removal of an 
internationally respected finance minister with someone perceived to be the President’s personal 
crony. But it is less clear whether business has learned the lesson that it is part and parcel of the 
political economy, shaping outcomes through its own actions and inactions. 
 
Indeed, there seems to be an enduring desire to situate change ‘out there’ rather than ‘in here’. The 
CBM was critiqued for largely failing in its declared objective of ‘facilitating change within our areas 
of influence’:  
 
While business leaders have been willing to participate in externally focused initiatives, they 
have proved less willing to apply themselves with equal rigour to transforming their 
organisations so that the organisations reflect the culture of non-racial democracy and 
human rights at organisational and operational levels. 
 
Some see contemporary resonance in this critique in the apparent persistent failure of business to 
embrace black economic empowerment measures, affirmative action, or the full import of the 
mining charter. There is a perceived willingness to complain about government policy without a 
commensurate willingness to build consensus for a better solution. Indeed, many businesses seem 
intent on pursuing the path of least resistance – entering into agreements with politically well-
connected elites to meet black ownership mandates, for example, rather than creating ownership 
vehicles that would directly benefit workers or communities – without seeing how this might feed 
the very system of patronage and state capture that business decries. 
 
Similarly, business does not yet seem willing to confront an economy that many perceive inevitably 
‘exacerbates inequality, un- and under-employment, and therefore grotesque levels of poverty’ 
because of capital’s dependence on a low wage economy and government’s reliance on the tax 
revenues it generates. This should give pause to those who imagine a reinvigorated role for business 
in leadership towards peaceful development of the country. Arguably, CBM was able to act as what 
Craig Charney describes as ‘stabilizing agents’ in the transition to constitutional democracy because 
it occupied the centre between the apartheid regime and the ANC. CBM could emphasize dialogue, 
trust building and consensus building, exactly because the solution space these enabled brought 
society closer to what business wanted. Yet consequential progress towards the social justice 
promised by the constitution may require tough medicine for business: higher wages, lower barriers 
to entry, less concentration of wealth, greater competition, and more direct accountability to the 
communities in which business operates. Business inaction – driven by apathy, or some say even 
antipathy – may be a result of business no longer occupying the social centre, and therefore being 
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unable to play a catalytic role in addressing ‘a degree of inequality that makes human community 
impossible’.  
 
A path forward for business in enabling peaceful development may still be found in the lessons of 
the CBM. As in the past, business seems to want to define the current crisis in its own terms, rather 
than acknowledging alongside a state capture crisis a psycho-social crisis, a nuclear family crisis, a 
spatial crisis, and an unemployment crisis, all of which are rooted in the country’s political history 
and political economy, and all of which are deeply entwined. As the founders of the CBM critiqued in 
the apartheid era, private sector ‘institutions and initiatives’ again appear ‘to want to follow an on-
going incremental route and to rely primarily upon Government-led initiatives’. Yet business ‘cannot 
afford itself the privilege of staying out of difficult conversations’. At the 20 year mark of the new 
constitution (4 February 2017), it is perhaps again time to recognize that ‘traditional methods of 
interaction’ by business are inadequate; and that a vanguard is required to reaffirm the power of 
dialogue, trust building, consensus within the broadest possible circle of South African society, 
fearless opposition to those inside and outside of government who resist progress, and business 
empowerment of those most in need of support. A ‘voluntary and independent group of senior 
business leaders and corporations’ might then again, as the CBM described its role, ‘acknowledge 
and support the need for constructive transformation of South Africa’s political economy’ in the 
interest of just and peaceful development. 
 
 
